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Abstract 
This paper examines the factors determining fee levels set by independent schools, focusing 
on the impact of competition, cooperation and regulatory intervention in the sector. Results 
indicate that, once account is taken of factors such as the extent of local competition between 
independent schools, the impact of the 2003-2005 Office of Fair Trading investigation into 
the fee-setting cartel on independent school fees becomes insignificant. Meanwhile, the 
extent of competition between independent schools has a significant effect on levels of 
boarding school fees. Results highlight the importance of considering pricing strategies of 
groups within a cartel. 
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Competition, Cooperation and Regulatory Intervention Impacts on Independent School 
Fees  
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the factors determining the fee levels set by independent secondary 
schools, focusing on the impacts of competition, cooperation and regulatory intervention in 
the sector. This is an important but much neglected topic in the literature. The independent 
school sector is an important part of the British education system with high quality graduates 
(Green et al. 2011) and parental decisions to send children to independent schools remaining 
popular (Independent Schools Council, 2015). Given this, it is surprising how little we know 
about the factors determining independent school fees. Below we shall first review the UK 
Independent School market to set out the context of the study. We then discuss the economic 
environment for independent schools with an emphasis on a recent investigation into the 
sector by The Office of Fair Trading (OFT).           
1.1 The UK Independent School Market  
The independent school sector in the UK stretches back as far as 1382 when William of 
Wykeham established Winchester College as a feeder school for New College, Oxford which 
he had set up in 1379. Students were first admitted to Winchester College in 1394. The 
establishment of further independent schools was initially relatively slow: Eton College was 
established in 1440, and in the 1550s St. Paul’s Cathedral School, Merchant Taylors’ School, 
Westminster School and Shrewsbury School were all formed (Turner, 2015). The fortunes of 
the independent school sector have been mixed in the ensuing centuries (Turner, 2015). 
However, at least until recently, the independent school sector strengthened its position in the 
market to educate children. The Independent Schools Council (ISC, 2015) indicates that in 
2015 there were 1,267 independent schools across the UK, covering both primary (typically 
up to the age of eleven) and secondary education (typically up to the age of eighteen). These 
schools currently educate over half a million pupils per year, with the numbers of children 
being educated in the independent sector growing steadily from just over 300,000 in the past 
forty years, while the average size of an independent school has gradually increased in the 
past thirty years from over 300 to above 400 pupils. Approximately 74% of pupils currently 
attend co-educational independent schools, with approximately 86% of these pupils being day 
pupils as opposed to boarders. Currently, 8.5% of pupils are not British, with schools starting 
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to set up overseas campuses, there now being 44 such campuses, educating almost 25,000 
pupils (ISC, 2015).  
There have also been gradual but ultimately dramatic increases in UK independent school 
fees since the 1980s (Ryan and Sibieta, 2010), such that the rise of independent school fees in 
the 2000s was in excess of increases in either average family or the highest family income 
(Good Schools Guide 2013). See Figure 1 below for average fee levels in the most recent 
years 2002-2012. Generally, average real fees have been increasing over the ten-year period, 
although fees dipped in 2007, this being explored in the paper below.i Further, average day 
fees at schools that offer both day and boarding provisions are higher than at day schools, a 
feature highlighted by Starkie and Wise (2006) and borne out in the regression results below, 
while the average boarding fees at day and boarding schools are lower than the average fees 
at boarding only schools. 
Figure 1 about here 
1.2 The Independent School Cartel Case 
Like firms in any industry, independent schools compete and cooperate with each other and 
the nature of competition and cooperation could have an impact on price (i.e. independent 
school fees). Back in 2003, fifty leading independent schools in the UK, including very high 
profile schools were exposed as potentially operating a fee-fixing cartel. The case was passed 
to The Office of Fair Trading (OFT), who concluded in 2005 that a fee setting cartel had 
existed in the 2001/2002 to 2003/2004 academic years. Further, the ‘Sevenoaks’ cartel had 
operated for longer, but the relevant UK 1998 Competition Act only came into force in 2000 
and there was then an additional year during which firms were given the opportunity to 
change their behaviour prior to consideration of cartel behaviour by the competition 
authorities. See Appendix 1 for a list of the schools found guilty of taking part in the cartel.  
A number of reasons can be offered to explain the stability of the cartel. One of the key 
factors often claimed to contribute to the stability of any cartel is a small number of firms, 
with similar cost conditions that the firms are knowledgeable about. Hence, it is notable that 
the fifty school UK independent school cartel survived for years, without schools leaving the 
cartel. This is particularly interesting, since following the introduction of the 1998 
Competition Act, the first school whistle-blowing on other cartel members could expect full 
exemption from any penalties offered under the Act, and fines up to 10% of UK turnover for 
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a maximum of three years may be imposed.ii Of course, the continued successful operation of 
the cartel may reflect the schools’ naivety that they were not breaking the law, either because 
they were not aware of changes to UK competition law in the late 1990s or from a misguided 
belief that the law did not apply to independent schools, typically with charity status assigned 
to them. Alternatively, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) highlight some long-lasting cartels 
involving large numbers of firms in a variety of industries, indicating that the success of 
cartels involving many firms may rest on the presence of industry associations or 
governmental support. This may at least partly explain the stability of the UK independent 
schools cartel as bursars are usually members of the Independent Schools’ Bursars 
Association, and admitted that they met regularly and discussed fee levels, although it has 
been claimed that this was done rather in an attempt to restrict fee increases in the face of cost 
increases (Guardian 2005). 
This paper aims to contribute to the limited economic literature on independent schools by 
providing an in-depth analysis of the nature of competition and cooperation between 
independent secondary schools, and the impact of regulatory intervention on levels of school 
fees covering both tuition and board. Specifically, an important question relates to the impact 
of the intervention by The OFT on independent school fees. The OFT produced a 2012 
review of its investigation into the fee-fixing cartel that it instigated from 2003, concluding in 
2005. According to The (2012) OFT report, as a result of The OFT investigation, fees at the 
schools that had been part of the fee-setting cartel had fallen significantly. However, the 
current research calls this result into question by extending The OFT (2012) research in a 
number of key ways. Crucially, the analysis below considers additional explanatory variables 
that may impact on fees including a range of measures of competition and cooperation that 
have typically not been adopted in the literature to date and also not adopted in the OFT 
(2012). First, the extent of local competition between independent schools is indicated by 
counting the number of independent schools within various distances around any individual 
school.iii Second, dummy variables are created, indicating formal and informal links between 
schools through common ownership and various affiliations. Finally, rather than relying 
solely on fixed effects panel data methods, a multi-level modelling approach is also adopted, 
again to capture the potential local nature of competition between independent schools. These 
advances give rise to a number of interesting results that highlight features of the nature of 
competition/cooperation in the UK independent school sector. Additionally, they reduce the 
impact of The OFT investigation on independent school fees, both day and boarding fees. In 
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addition to making an empirical contribution to the limited literature on economic analyses of 
the independent school sector, this study offers important lessons for competition authorities 
investigating cartels more generally.   
 
2. Literature Review 
As highlighted in Section 1 above, there is only a very limited literature on independent 
school fees. Below we shall first provide a summary of the OFT (2012) report which forms 
the basis of our analysis. We then proceed to a brief discussion of the existing economic 
analyses of the Independent School Sector.   
2.1 The Office of Fair Trading (2012) Report 
The OFT (2012) report uses a difference in differences approach considering factors 
impacting on independent senior school fees, considering schools that were part of the 
Sevenoaks cartel as well as seemingly comparable independent schools that were not within 
the cartel. The analysis considers the impact of the cartel on fees through the use of data 
during the period of the cartel 2001-2004 considered by the competition authorities, and data 
from the 2004-2005 academic year onwards when the cartel had been discovered and was 
being investigated.iv The analysis rests on the assumptions that following detection, cartel 
members were likely to change their pricing strategy such that significant changes in prices 
may be identified at least gradually if not immediately, with similar changes in prices not 
being expected if the cartel had not been detected. Separate panel data, fixed effects 
regressions are reported for logged real day fees and real boarding fees. The fixed effects 
model used by The OFT (2012) took the following form: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵%𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑧𝑧𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   School fee for school i in year t 
𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵%𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Percentage of boarders in school i in year t 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  FT ranking for school i in year t 
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑧𝑧𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   Number of pupils in school i in year t 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 Dummy variable equal to unity in years after the start of the OFT 
investigation, i.e. the 2004/5 academic year onwards 
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Dummy variable equal to unity if a school was a cartel member and the 
observation relates to the post OFT investigation period 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖   Dummy variable for school i  
εit Disturbance term follows the normal distribution with zero mean and 
constant variance.  
Results indicated that both logged real day and boarding fees increased after the cartel was 
detected, with this fee increase significant at a 1% significance level. However, crucially, the 
coefficient on Infringe*Post, the difference in differences (DiD) variable, was found to be 
negative and significant, typically at a 5% significance level, indicating that while across the 
senior, independent school sector there was a tendency for fees to increase, following 
detection of the cartel, fees of the participating cartel members fell. However, the number of 
explanatory variables included in The OFT (2012) report is limited. In particular, it fails to 
take into account the nature of competition and possible cooperation between independent 
secondary schools, which may lead to biased estimates of the DiD variable, thus limiting the 
validity of the findings. This is addressed in the analysis below. 
2.2 Economic Analyses of the Independent School Sector 
Economic analyses of fee-setting by UK independent schools remain relatively scarce with 
the exceptions of  Starkie and Wise (2006) who consider factors determining day fees, but not 
fees for boarding students, and The OFT (2012) report mentioned above. Other economic 
analyses of the independent school sector also remain few. Recent research from the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies examines factors impacting demand for independent school places (Blow et 
al., 2010; Blundell et al., 2010; Dearden and Sibieta, 2010). Graddy and Stevens (2005) 
consider the factors contributing to independent schools’ success in A-level examinations, the 
most common final school examinations taken by school pupils around the age of eighteen.v 
Meanwhile, work by Green et al. (2011) into the wage benefit of attending an independent 
school in Britain builds on previous analyses by Dolton and Vignoles (2000); Dearden et al. 
(2002); Naylor et al. (2002). 
 
7 
 
3. Data and Econometric Methodology 
3.1 Data and Variables Used 
Annual independent school data across ten academic years (2002/2003 to 2011/2012) were 
obtained from two sources: The Good Schools Guide (GSG) and The Financial Times (FT) 
Independent Schools Guide. While The FT Guide includes information on a much larger 
number of schools, The GSG was used to decide the schools included in the final sample. 
This is because the aim is to estimate the impact of the fee-setting cartel on fees charged, and 
the schools in the cartel were all high profile schools, enjoying reputations for the quality of 
their provisions. Consequently, the fee-setting behaviour of these schools should be 
compared with that of schools as comparable as possible. As such, The GSG can be argued to 
provide a good indication of schools to be included in the sample, with supplementary data 
for these schools being taken from The FT Guide. Note that specialist music, dance and arts 
schools were excluded from the dataset. While The OFT included these schools in its 
statistical analyses, they have been removed from the dataset as not only is it expected that to 
some degree additional factors may affect fee levels, but also because the UK Government’s 
Music and Dance Scheme provides means-tested funding to cover the cost of at least partial 
tuition fees. All schools in the final analysis offer education from eleven or thirteen to 
eighteen, but some schools have junior departments in addition. Attention focuses on the 
levels of secondary or senior school fees, rather than fees for sixteen to eighteen year olds, 
which sometimes differ slightly. 
The GSG provides data on annual day and boarding fees, the numbers of pupils, 6th form 
pupils, boarders and any religious affiliation of the school where appropriate. Similar data are 
provided in The FT Guide, so data were compared across both publications to confirm 
consistency. In addition, The FT provides information on the rankings awarded to schools by 
The FT, the average standard of students on entry into any sixth form and exit from it in 
terms of points associated with GCSE and A level examination results, the average number of 
A level subjects studied and the percentage of boys in any school.  
There was a concern that neither The FT Guide nor The GSG updated day and boarding fees 
every year, with the publications reporting similar fees, but with numerous instances of fees 
remaining constant for two or three successive years in one publication, while fees in the 
other publication rose.vi Consequently, new day and boarding fees dependent variables were 
created by taking the maximum value of the reported fee of either publication for any year. 
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This method gives rise to day and boarding fees variables with much more regular fee 
increases. Appendix 2 provides an example of the method used. Fee variables were then 
adjusted for inflation, using the all-item Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2005=100. Additional 
information on school fee descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 3, alongside 
descriptive statistics for explanatory variables used.  
As The OFT 2012 results are the starting point for the current analysis, initially the same 
explanatory variables were used. The percentage of boarders (FTBoard%) is included as 
schools with greater boarding provision may feel under pressure to offer better and more 
extensive facilities which in turn require higher levels of fees. Thus we expect a positive 
relationship between FTBoard% and school fees. Similarly, better ranked schools (FTRank) 
may achieve these rankings partly because of investments made that may require higher 
levels of fees to fund. However, as better ranked schools take lower values of rankings, we 
expect a negative coefficient on FTRank. The size of school (Size), measured by the number 
of pupils may impact on fee levels positively or negatively, as larger schools may face 
economies or diseconomies of scale. As in The OFT (2012) report, a dummy variable 
(Infringe) is used to indicate whether a school was part of the Sevenoaks fee-setting cartel to 
examine the impact of the cartel on fees. A dummy variable (Postintervention) was created to 
indicate the 2004/2005 academic year onwards from which time the original OFT 
investigation may have had a significant impact on fees. An interaction variable between 
Infringe and Postintervention could then be created (Infringe*Post) to provide a difference in 
differences estimator (DiD) to indicate the impact of The OFT investigation specifically on 
the Sevenoaks cartel member school fees.  
In addition to the explanatory variables considered by The OFT (2012) report, an explanatory 
variable was created to test whether there was any impact on independent schools’ fee setting 
strategies during the period in which The OFT was investigating the schools, in addition to 
after the conclusion of the investigation. Hence, a dummy variable (OFTThreat) is included 
in the regressions taking the value unity during the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 academic 
years.vii This explanatory variable is included to reflect the possibility that schools may have 
decided ‘to make hay while the sun shines’, increasing fees while the investigation 
proceeded, fearing their ability to continue to do so after the investigation had ended. 
Alternatively, it is possible that schools could limit fee increases while under investigation. 
Elliott and Wei (2010) concluded that store card interest rates fell significantly while the 
industry was subject to a market investigation by The UK Competition Commission from 
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2004 to 2006. A further DiD variable was created by multiplying the Infringe and OFTThreat 
variables, in an attempt to identify an effect of The OFT investigation, specifically on 
member schools of the Sevenoaks cartel, during the investigation period. 
Further explanatory variables of competition and cooperation were also created. The GSG 
provides postcodes for schools. Geocodes were obtained based on this information and used 
to draw circular areas around any school, so that counts of the number of competing 
independent schools in an area each year could be obtained to give measures of the extent of 
competition between independent schools in any area (Competition). For day fees, total 
yearly counts of each independent day school and independent school offering day and 
boarding provision within one and ten mile radii were obtained.viii  In terms of boarding fees, 
for each independent boarding school and ‘day and boarding school’, total yearly counts of 
boarding schools and ‘day and boarding’ schools within twenty five mile and fifty mile radii 
were obtained. The assumption, to be tested statistically, was that a greater number of schools 
in an area would indicate a more competitive environment and so be expected to lead to 
downward pressure on fees. This is expected for day fees, but also for boarding fees as 
Starkie and Wise (2006) highlight the increasing provision for weekly boarding at schools 
that offer boarding provision, such that pupils can return home at weekends. Traditionally, 
local competitive pressures would be less relevant to boarding schools as students may board 
at a school a substantial distance from their homes, but the increased popularity of weekly 
boarding may enhance competition between schools in areas broader than those considered 
for day schools. Squared competition variables were also created to test whether the 
relationship between the number of competing independent schools in an area and school fees 
was potentially non-linear. 
There are a number of school groupings in the British independent school sector that may 
result in cooperation across schools, so dummy variables were also created to identify these. 
These groups encompass schools under common ownership such as the Cognita; GEMS; 
Woodard and United Church Schools Trust (UCST) groups of schools, and looser school 
affiliations such as The Eton Group; The Rugby Group; The Yorkshire Boarding School 
Group (YBSG); and the Girls’ Day School Trust (GDST). Dummy variables were also 
created to indicate schools sharing the same religious affiliations.ix The expectation is that 
schools under common ownership may be expected to have more similar fee levels, but that 
in the absence of collusion, holding all else constant, other school groupings are unlikely to 
impact on fee levels set.  
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School data were supplemented with annual population (Population) and local real mean 
income (Income) data for the county in which any school is located, from The Office for 
National Statistics. Annual fee and income levels were converted into real values again using 
the all-item Consumer Price Index, 2005=100. 
Consequently, a much richer set of explanatory variables have been collated to model factors 
impacting on independent school fees than used previously. This reflects the broader remit of 
the current research that intends to consider multiple facets of competition and potential 
cooperation between independent schools, whereas The OFT (2012) evaluation necessarily 
focused on the impact of its investigation into independent school fee levels since The OFT 
case was concluded. 
3.2 Methodology 
The initial, baseline model estimated is a fixed effects model, comparable to that used by The 
OFT (2012). To extend The OFT analysis we employ more recent data for an unbalanced 
panel of schools and introduce additional explanatory variables including competition, 
regulatory threat, school grouping, and schools’ religious affiliation variables.  
We then use multi-level mixed effects (MLME) models that take into account the hierarchical 
data structure in which schools nest within regions.  Although in preliminary OLS regressions 
we considered the impact of two regional-level variables, i.e. income and population, on 
tuition fees (both day and boarding fees), other regional-specific but unobservable processes 
might also impact on fees and should be addressed in the modelling. Failing to allow for this 
within-region correlation could result in biased results and incorrect inferences, and 
ultimately in spurious results. Hence, results from mixed effects models are reported below 
but, for comparison purposes, OLS regression results are presented in Appendix 4.x Recent 
advances in multilevel modelling enable the formulation of models that account for the 
random variation at group or regional levels (Clarke et al. 2015; Jones, 1991). Such models 
avoid the aggregation problem by permitting the response variable (y) to vary from region to 
region. In our analysis, we consider a two-level hierarchical model of tuition fees within 
regions, setting schools at level 1 and regions at level 2. The model specifies the relationship 
between a dependent variable (y) and independent variables (X, a vector of level 1 school 
characteristics, and Z, a vector of level 2 school region-level variables) as follows:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾′𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
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where the subscript i refers to an individual school in region j. The region is defined in terms 
of geographical area, here a county. Random elements are captured by μj and εij. The above 
model can also be estimated as a fixed-effects (FE) model by including regional and school 
dummies (Clarke et al. 2015). However, including a set of dummies would prevent the testing 
of the significance of such variables as those indicating the cartel, school groupings and 
school religious affiliations, which are also captured by dummy variables. 
 
In our case, individual school characteristics (Level 1) include: log(Size); Infringe (i.e. 
whether the school was found guilty of membership in the Sevenoaks cartel); FTBoard% and 
FTRank. Characteristics of school regions (Level 2) include log(Income) and 
log(Population). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Main Results 
Table 1 reports the results of the baseline regressions, comparable to those reported by The 
OFT (2012). To ensure comparability, fixed effects regressions are used with results reported 
for two dependent variables: (logged) real day and boarding fees. The results indicate that 
schools found guilty of being party to the fee-setting cartel (Infringe) had higher fees during 
the academic years 2002/2003 to 2011/2012 that are covered by this dataset, and that 
independent school fees have increased significantly since the original OFT investigation 
(Postintervention). However, the coefficients on the difference in differences (DiD) 
estimators are never significantly different from zero, suggesting that since The OFT 
investigation there has been no significant impact on the levels of fees set by schools 
involved in the fee-setting cartel. This is in contrast to the results of The OFT (2012) analysis. 
The OFT (2012) results indicate the real fees have increased to a greater extent than the 
results in Table 1 suggest, and more importantly, the coefficient on the DiD estimator is 
negative and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. A possible explanation for 
these differences is that the current dataset covers an additional four years of data, and from 
Figure 1 it can be seen that for the sample of schools included in the current dataset, average 
real fees decreased in the final year of the data. However, these results are only preliminary, 
and additional explanatory variables need to be included to obtain a clearer view of the 
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factors determining independent school fees, as well as to ensure against omitted variable 
bias. 
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 reports results that include additional explanatory variables that may influence 
independent school fees. The first two specifications, specifications (2.1) and (2.2) in the 
table are for day fees and specifications (2.3) and (2.4) are for boarding fees. In different 
specifications, different measures of the Competition variable are employed to depict possible 
local market competitive effects. In specifications (2.1) and (2.2), Competition is measured 
by the number of competing independent schools offering day pupil provision in either a 1 
mile or 10 mile radius, respectively. In specifications (2.3) and (2.4), Competition is 
measured by the number of competing independent schools offering boarding provision in 
either a 25 mile or 50 mile radius, respectively.  Population and Income are included with the 
anticipation that if these variables have any impact on independent school fees, then the 
effect may be expected to be positive. Possible impacts on independent school fees while The 
OFT cartel investigation was ongoing are portrayed through the inclusion of the OFTThreat 
and Infringe*OFTThreat variables. Finally, dummy variables are included to identify both 
formal and potential informal school groupings that may have similar fee setting strategies.  
Table 2 about here 
As in the baseline regressions, Size is not found to have any significant impact on fees set, 
although schools with greater proportions of boarding pupils are now found to set higher fees. 
This is expected as the schools are likely to need to invest in a greater range of facilities for 
their pupils. The FT ranking of a school continues to have no impact on day fees although 
now better FT ranked schools are associated with significantly higher boarding fees, which 
again may reflect the facilities at schools with boarding provision. 
As in the baseline regressions, schools that were part of the Sevenoaks cartel are found to 
have significantly higher day and boarding fees, always at the 1% significance level. 
However, once we control for a greater range of explanatory variables in Table 2, we find 
that there is no significant impact of The OFT investigation on fees across the sector in the 
post investigation period as the coefficients on Postintervention are no longer statistically 
significant. Similarly, focusing on cartel members, their day fees are not significantly 
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different in the post OFT intervention period, although their boarding fees are found to be 
significantly lower, at a 5% significance level.  
The OFT (2012) report did not specifically consider any impacts on fees while The OFT 
investigation was ongoing but the results in Table 2 indicate that while The OFT 
investigation took place the independent school sector increased fees significantly, the 
coefficient on OFTThreat always being positive and significantly different from zero at a 1% 
significance level. This may reflect the schools’ fear that their ability to increases fees after 
the completion of The OFT investigation would be curtailed, but alternatively may reflect the 
buoyancy of the independent school sector and the UK economy in the mid-2000s, the 
statistical analysis unable to distinguish between these possible explanations. Nevertheless, it 
appears that cartel member schools reduced day but not boarding fees slightly during the 
period of the investigation as the coefficient associated with the Infringe*OFTThreat variable 
is negative, although admittedly only at a 10% significance level, in the day fee regressions. 
Consequently, while The OFT investigation was ongoing there was a difference in the fee 
setting strategies of cartel versus non-cartel members, with only cartel members restricting 
fee increases. Similarly, we find that, while there is no significant impact of The OFT 
investigation on fees across the sector in the post investigation period because coefficients on 
Postintervention are statically insignificant, focusing only on the Sevenoaks cartel members, 
these schools have significantly reduced their boarding fees given the significant values 
associated with Infringe*Post (DiD). 
The extent of competition is not found to have any effect on day fees, considering the number 
of competing independent schools offering day pupil provision in either a 1 mile or 10 mile 
radius in specifications (2.1) and (2.2). We speculate that this may be because, particularly 
outside the capital city, there are often so few schools competing to attract day pupils within 
these radii. However, the standard competition result emerges in the boarding school sector, 
with competition between greater numbers of schools offering boarding provision being 
associated with significantly lower boarding fees (at a 1% significance level), regardless of 
whether the number of schools within a 25 mile or 50 mile radius is considered. Fees are, 
unsurprisingly, found to be significantly greater in counties with higher real, mean income 
levels.   
The remaining dummy variables are included to capture the impact of potential competition 
and cooperation between independent schools on school fees by considering schools under 
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common ownership (the Woodard and UCST school groups), looser school affiliations (the 
Eton, Rugby, YBSG and GDST groups) and possible school affiliations that may arise when 
schools share a religious affiliation.xi The results indicate that considering these alliances of 
schools and schools under common ownership differences in fee-setting strategies emerge. 
For example, the Eton group of schools have significantly greater day and boarding fee levels 
compared to other schools, while the Rugby group of schools has significantly higher day 
fees, but not boarding fees compared to other schools in the dataset. Seventeen out of the 
eighteen Rugby group of schools were found to be part of the Sevenoaks cartel, while five of 
the twelve members of The Eton group were not identified as part of the cartel.xii Hence, 
these results suggest that within the cartel subgroups of schools may have had significantly 
different fee setting strategies, and that while the statistical results indicate that the fifty 
school who were found to have participated in the cartel have significantly higher fee levels, 
other factors may also have a significant effect on fee levels set and participation in the cartel 
was insufficient to ensure similar fee levels and increases. More generally, in terms of 
implications for competition policy investigations, results indicate that when large numbers 
of cartel members are identified, it is worthwhile investigating whether there are subgroups 
within the cartel that share more similar pricing strategies than for the cartel as a whole.xiii  
4.2 Robustness Checks 
A number of robustness checks were performed. First, the regressions were rerun with a 
balanced panel of schools that remain in The GSG and The FT throughout the data period. 
This reduces the sample size considerably to 1,080 school-year observations for schools 
offering day pupil provision and 530 school-year observations for schools offering boarding 
provision. Results are reassuringly comparable to those reported above, with key results 
reported in Table 3a below.xiv In particular, as in the results reported in Table 2, but in 
contrast to the baseline regressions of Table 1, the coefficients on the Postintervention 
dummy variable are always insignificantly different from zero, and this is also always true of 
the coefficients on the DiD variable (Infringe*Post), reducing confidence in the evidence 
above that The OFT investigation had at least some effect in terms of reducing boarding 
school fees. Again it is found that during The OFT investigation day and boarding fees across 
the sector rose significantly, at a 1% significance level, while it is found that cartel member 
schools did not increase either day or boarding fees during this period as the coefficients on 
the DiD Infringe*OFTThreat variable are now always insignificantly different from zero. 
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Table 3a about here 
Secondly, the regressions above were repeated, with the data restricted to the early years of 
data, specifically with the 2007-2008 academic year being the final year of data. This was to 
control for any impact of the financial crisis and following recession that may have impacted 
upon parents’ ability to pay for independent schooling, and any resulting impact on schools’ 
fee setting strategies. Again, results are comparable to those reported in Tables 2 and 3a 
above, with key results reported in Table 3b. Once more, there was no significant effect of 
The OFT investigation on the school fees set by members of the Sevenoaks cartel after the 
investigation had been completed, and little effect while it took place. Meanwhile during the 
investigation day and boarding fees increased significantly across the sector except in cartel 
member schools. However, one consistent difference in the results emerges, namely that 
immediately after The OFT investigation had been concluded, fees across the independent 
schools sector generally were significantly lower. This is despite the conclusion above that 
there was little change in the fee setting strategies of the members of the Sevenoaks cartel, 
and the financial crisis was yet to occur. As such, the results are in keeping with the dip in 
day and boarding fees seen across the independent schools sector in 2007 in Figure 1 above. 
This suggests that after the conclusion of The OFT investigation there was an initial negative 
impact generally on independent school fees across the sector, but that this effect has 
dissipated over time, as can be seen in the results from the full sample period above.  
Table 3b about here 
A number of additional robustness checks were performed.xv Regressions were rerun, 
including squared competition variables to test whether the relationship between competition 
and school fees was potentially non-linear but the coefficients on the squared competition 
variables were consistently insignificantly different from zero. Regressions were also rerun 
using an alternative dummy variable that took the value of unity in the 2003/2004; 2004/2005 
and 2005/2006 academic years as an alternative indicator of the period when The OFT 
investigation took place with no substantial effect on the statistical results. Regressions were 
also re-estimated using the FT rather than the GSG religious affiliation dummy variables. The 
results were, unsurprisingly, very similar given that both publications obtain this information 
directly from the schools.   
Finally, propensity matching, probit regressions were run using the most recent (2011/2012) 
academic year of data to check the result that consistently emerges above - members of the 
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former Sevenoaks cartel have higher fees than other schools. The method allows this result to 
be tested comparing Sevenoaks schools with other schools in the dataset that are as similarly 
matched as possible, addressing concerns raised in White (2006). We first estimated the 
propensity score by running probit regressions of the treatment dummy (being a member of 
the Sevenoaks cartel) on the following six variables: log(Size); percentage of boarders; 
competition; log(Income); log(Population). Balancing tests confirmed that the propensity 
score specification satisfies the balancing property. Based on the propensity score, we 
matched the treated schools with similar non-treated schools using three matching 
procedures, namely the nearest neighbour matching, radius matching and kernel matching 
methods and estimated the average treatment effect on the treated schools (ATT). All 
estimations were carried out with bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications while 
imposing a common support condition in the matching algorithm. Results in Table 4 below 
indicate that regardless of matching method used and whether a 1 or 10 mile radius around a 
school offering day pupil provision was used to calculate the number of relevant competing 
independent schools, members of the former Sevenoaks cartel still had significantly higher 
day fees in the 2011/2012 academic year. However, there is less evidence that former 
Sevenoaks cartel members still had higher boarding fees in this year, with this result only 
emerging when the radius matching method was used.  
Table 4 about here 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper considers factors that determine independent school fees, with a particular focus 
on the impact of competition, cooperation and regulatory intervention, i.e. The Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) investigation into fifty leading schools that concluded in 2005 that a fee-
setting cartel had operated. A number of consistent results emerge. Members of the 
Sevenoaks cartel have consistently set higher fees than other independent schools, but little 
impact of The OFT investigation on cartel member fees can be identified either during the 
investigation or after its conclusion. This contrasts with the conclusions of The OFT (2012) 
report into the effects of its 2003-2005 investigation, and can be explained by the use of a 
broader set of explanatory variables to ensure that results do not suffer from omitted variable 
bias, and the use of mixed effects, multi-level regressions that capture more accurately the 
local or regional nature of competition between independent schools. The conclusion that The 
17 
 
OFT investigation had little effect on the fee setting strategies of the cartel member schools 
lends some support to the claim of these schools that the intention of the cartel was not to 
raise fees and hence there was no reason to change fee setting strategies either during The 
OFT case or after it had been completed. Any effects of The OFT investigation across the 
independent schools sector only appear to have been temporary reductions in day and 
boarding fees after the close of the case, these quickly dissipating. However, note that 
independent schools (but not members of the cartel being investigated) were found to 
increase fees significantly during the period when The OFT was investigating the case. 
Although fifty schools were found to have participated in the cartel, there are also additional 
alliances of independent schools in Britain. Significant differences in the fee-setting strategies 
of these school alliances have been identified. This suggests that competition authorities 
should take explicit account of sub-groups within any identified cartel when estimating the 
price effects of a cartel and also the impact of any regulatory intervention.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1 below lists schools found guilty by The Office of Fair Trading of participating in 
the Sevenoaks cartel, so named as Sevenoaks School collated and distributed fee information 
between cartel members. 
Table A1: Sevenoaks Cartel Members 
Ampleforth College Mill Hill School 
Bedford School Oakham School 
Benenden School Oundle School ~ 
Bradfield College ~ Radley College ~ 
Bromsgrove School Repton School ~ 
Bryanston School # Royal Hospital School 
Canford School Rugby School ~ 
Charterhouse School ~ St. Edward’s School, Oxford ~ 
Cheltenham College ~ St. Leonards-Mayfield School 
Cheltenham Ladies College Sedbergh School * 
Clifton College ~ Sevenoaks School 
Cranleigh School Sherborne School # 
Dauntsey’s School Shrewsbury School ~ 
Downe House School Stowe School ~ 
Eastbourne College Strathallan School 
Epsom College Tonbridge School # 
Eton College # Truro School * 
Gresham’s School Uppingham School ~ 
Haileybury School ~ Wellington College ~ 
Harrow School ~ Wells Cathedral School 
King’s School Canterbury # Westminster School # 
Lancing College Winchester College ~ 
Malvern College ~ Woldingham School 
Marlborough College # Worth School 
Millfield School Wycombe Abbey 
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* indicates a school that participated in the cartel for only two out of the three academic 
years. # indicates a member of the Eton group of schools; ~ indicates a member of the Rugby 
group of schools. 
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Appendix 2 
Table A2 below uses data from one representative (anonymised) school to illustrate the 
concern that neither The Good Schools Guide (GSG) nor The Financial Times (FT) 
necessarily always received and reported annual fee updates. Hence, new day and boarding 
fees variables were created, using the maximum relevant day or boarding fee value as 
reported in either publication in any year. 
Table A2: School Fees Variable Details 
Year Day Fees 
GSG 
Day Fees  
FT 
Boarding Fees  
GSG 
Boarding Fees  
FT 
Maximum  
Day Fees 
Maximum  
Boarding Fees 
2003 14085 14085 18780 18780 14085 18780 
2004 15420 15420 20550 20550 15420 20550 
2005 16335 16335 21780 21780 16335 21780 
2006 16995 16995 22980 22980 16995 22980 
2007 16995 16995 22980 22980 16995 22980 
2008 18915 16995 25575 22980 18915 25575 
2009 19860 19860 26850 26850 19860 26850 
2010 19860 19900 27390 26800 19900 27390 
2011 20400 19900 28125 27400 20400 28125 
2012 21015 20400 28965 28100 21015 28965 
Note: All values in £ sterling, before adjusting for inflation. 
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Appendix 3  
Table A3a: School Fee Descriptive Statistics 
Year Day Schools Boarding Schools Day and Boarding  
Day                 Boarding 
2003 7720 (1357) 
84 
20194 (475) 
8 
11475 (2498) 
114 
17421 (2179) 
114 
2004 8296 (1392) 
88 
21754 (662) 
8 
12191 (2691) 
114 
18565 (2395) 
114 
2005 8772 (1495) 
100 
22694 (608) 
8 
12522 (2885) 
126 
19465 (2892) 
126 
2006 9107 (1592) 
117 
23469 (576) 
8 
12846 (2869) 
137 
19872 (2460) 
137 
2007 8897 (1533) 
118 
23392 (1756) 
8 
12562 (2828) 
141 
19469 (2337) 
141 
2008 9574 (1701) 
128 
24439 (1758) 
6 
13352 (3152) 
153 
20987 (2526) 
153 
2009 9908 (1751) 
131 
25961 (2132) 
8 
13887 (3108) 
162 
21651 (2511) 
162 
2010 10022 (1892) 
136 
26330 (2252) 
9 
13991 (3124) 
168 
21904 (2617) 
168 
2011 10103 (1938) 
143 
26329 (2147) 
9 
14043 (3199) 
176 
21946 (2586) 
176 
2012 9912 (1693) 
143 
26027 (2056) 
8 
13941 (3155) 
174 
21794 (2603) 
174 
Notes: In each cell, the first value is the mean value of real school fees for the relevant 
category of school, with the standard deviation of these fees in parentheses. Below these 
values is a count of the number of schools in the sample in each cell. 
Table A3b: Continuous Explanatory Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
log(Size) 6.337 0.436 
FTboard% 0.237 0.300 
log(Income) 10.124 0.207 
log(Population) 7.055 1.088 
Competition (1 mile) 0.530 0.856 
Competition (10 miles) 8.348 11.881 
Competition (25 miles) 10.279 7.935 
Competition (50 miles) 32.092 19.429 
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Appendix 4  
Table A4: OLS Regression Results 
     
 log(Real Day Fees) log(Real Boarding Fees) 
     
log(Size) -0.03647*** -0.0355*** 0.0366*** 0.0364*** 
 [0.0085] [0.0087] [0.0101] [0.0102] 
FTboard% 0.6199*** 0.6176*** 0.2817*** 0.2813*** 
 [0.0187] [0.0195] [0.0130] [0.0131] 
Infringe 0.0950*** 0.0940*** 0.0241** 0.0257** 
 [0.0178] [0.0175] [0.0107] [0.0107] 
Postintervention 0.0001 0.0043 0.0158 0.0215** 
 [0.0101] [0.0101] [0.0106] [0.0106] 
Infringe*Post (DiD) -0.0099 -0.0104 -0.0135 -0.0143 
 [0.0168] [0.0164] [0.0102] [0.0102] 
FTrank 0.0120*** 0.0097*** -0.0012 -0.0007 
 [0.0031] [0.0030] [0.0026] [0.0026] 
Year 0.0274*** 0.0267*** 0.0274*** 0.0265*** 
 [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0016] 
log(Income) 0.4819*** 0.4042*** 0.1876*** 0.1065*** 
 [0.0138] [0.0186] [0.0222] [0.0239] 
log(Population) 0.0025 -0.0089*** -0.0101*** -0.0067* 
 [0.0027] [0.0032] [0.0039] [0.0039] 
Competition (1 mile) 0.0198***    
 [0.0035]    
Competition (10 miles)  0.0027***   
  [0.0004]   
Competition (25 miles)   -0.0011**  
   [0.0005]  
Competition (50 miles)    0.0005** 
    [0.0002] 
OFTThreat 0.0281*** 0.0284*** 0.0297*** 0.0297*** 
 [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0089] [0.0089] 
Infringe*OFTThreat -0.0146 -0.0125 -0.0023 -0.0015 
 [0.0191] [0.0187] [0.0113] [0.0113] 
Church of England 0.0370*** 0.0349*** 0.0195** 0.0217*** 
 [0.0074] [0.0075] [0.0083] [0.0082] 
Roman Catholic -0.0428*** -0.0487*** 0.0025 -0.0011 
 [0.0138] [0.0138] [0.0094] [0.0097] 
Methodist 0.0756*** 0.0750*** -0.0125 -0.0046 
 [0.0219] [0.0227] [0.0130] [0.0130] 
Quaker 0.0567*** 0.0567*** 0.0618*** 0.0644*** 
 [0.0198] [0.0195] [0.0132] [0.0127] 
Eton 0.1578*** 0.1378*** 0.0810*** 0.0766*** 
 [0.0108] [0.0113] [0.0119] [0.0120] 
Rugby 0.0067 0.0156 -0.0165** -0.0152* 
 [0.0152] [0.0149] [0.0080] [0.0079] 
YBSG -0.0620** -0.0514* -0.0600*** -0.0485*** 
 [0.0258] [0.0273] [0.0113] [0.0124] 
GDST -0.1061*** -0.1182*** -0.1094*** -0.1249*** 
 [0.0067] [0.0064] [0.0196] [0.0198] 
UCST -0.0562*** -0.0421*** 0.0460** 0.0536** 
 [0.0122] [0.0132] [0.0215] [0.0220] 
Woodard 0.0561*** 0.0596*** 0.0250*** 0.0221** 
 [0.0212] [0.0203] [0.0087] [0.0088] 
N 2363 2363 1316 1316 
R2 0.773 0.774 0.634 0.634 
adj. R2 0.771 0.772 0.628 0.628 
25 
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Table 1: Baseline Regression Results 
Dependent Variable log(Real Day Fees) log(Real Boarding Fees) 
log(Size) 0.0086  
(0.0101) 
0.0028 
(0.0123) 
FTBoard% 0.0615 
(0.0378)  
0.0228 
(0.0231) 
Infringe 0.1699*** 
(0.0237) 
0.2074*** 
(0.0163) 
Postintervention 0.0337*** 
(0.0034) 
0.0303*** 
(0.0052) 
Infringe*Post 
(DiD) 
0.0024 
(0.0069) 
-0.0080 
(0.0059) 
FTRank 0.0016 
(0.0022) 
-0.0031 
(0.0026) 
Year 0.0238*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0237*** 
(0.0007) 
School dummies Yes Yes 
N 2363 1316 
Adjusted 𝐹𝐹2 0.973 0.922 
Notes:  
1. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2: Main Regression Results of Mixed Effects Multi Level (MEML) Models 
 log(Real Day Fees) log(Real Boarding Fees) 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
log(Size) -0.0038 -0.0040 0.0098 0.0087 
 [0.0082] [0.0082] [0.0100] [0.0100] 
FTboard% 0.2148*** 0.2138*** 0.1144*** 0.1115*** 
 [0.0204] [0.0204] [0.0180] [0.0180] 
Infringe 0.1773*** 0.17709*** 0.0675*** 0.0694*** 
 [0.0293] [0.0293] [0.0199] [0.0202] 
Postintervention -0.0024 -0.0023 0.0048 0.0046 
 [0.0037] [0.0038] [0.0045] [0.0045] 
Infringe*Post (DiD) 0.0017 0.0014 -0.0115** -0.0110** 
 [0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0054] [0.0054] 
FTrank 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0043** -0.0044** 
 [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0022] [0.0022] 
Year 0.0280*** 0.0281*** 0.0283*** 0.0290*** 
 [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0008] 
log(Income) 0.4288*** 0.4302*** 0.3392*** 0.3507*** 
 [0.0247] [0.0250] [0.0279] [0.0280] 
log(Population) 0.0018 0.0017 -0.0062** -0.0065** 
 [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0027] [0.0027] 
Competition (1 mile) 0.0031    
 [0.0038]    
Competition (10 miles)  -0.0001   
  [0.0005]   
Competition (25 miles)   -0.0025***  
   [0.0008]  
Competition (50 miles)    -0.0016*** 
    [0.0004] 
OFTThreat 0.0278*** 0.0280*** 0.0297*** 0.0301*** 
 [0.0024] [0.0025] [0.0032] [0.0032] 
Infringe*OFTThreat -0.0104* -0.0104* -0.0001 -0.0002 
 [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0059] [0.0059] 
Church of England 0.0059 0.0056 0.0111 0.0124 
 [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0087] [0.0086] 
Roman Catholic -0.0148 -0.0155 0.0090 0.0102 
 [0.03105] [0.0311] [0.0248] [0.0252] 
Methodist 0.0508 0.0509 -0.0023 -0.0002 
 [0.0554] [0.0554] [0.0363] [0.0370] 
Quaker 0.0320 0.0308 0.0134 0.0118 
 [0.0525] [0.0525] [0.0352] [0.0358] 
Eton 0.1556*** 0.15680*** 0.0815** 0.0829** 
 [0.0474] [0.0475] [0.0364] [0.0370] 
Rugby 0.1555*** 0.1571*** 0.0237 0.0257 
 [0.0449] [0.0449] [0.0278] [0.0283] 
YBSG 0.1335 0.1374* -0.0605 -0.0747 
 [0.0830] [0.0829] [0.0513] [0.0521] 
GDST -0.0894*** -0.0900*** -0.0898 -0.0888 
 [0.0257] [0.0257] [0.0631] [0.0643] 
28 
 
UCST -0.0842 -0.0842 -0.0003 -0.0052 
 [0.0582] [0.0583] [0.0526] [0.0536] 
Woodard 0.1719*** 0.1718*** 0.0524 0.0525 
 [0.0574] [0.0574] [0.0395] [0.0402] 
N 2363 2363 1316 1316 
LR test:  
MEML versus OLS 
4006.18*** 3995.59*** 1634.23*** 1642.72*** 
Notes:  
1. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3a: Robustness Checks – Key Results from Balanced Panel Regressions 
 log(Real Day Fees) log(Real Boarding Fees) 
Competition variable 
measured in 
1 mile 
radius 
10 mile 
Radius 
25 mile 
radius 
50 mile radius 
Infringe 0.2475*** 0.2468*** 0.0993*** 0.0985*** 
 [0.0544] [0.0544] [0.0356] [0.0362] 
Postintervention -0.0041 -0.0037 -0.0001 -0.0008 
 [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0077] [0.0077] 
Infringe*Post (DiD) 0.0022 0.0014 -0.0076 -0.0075 
 [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0091] [0.0090] 
OFTThreat 0.0281*** 0.0283*** 0.0343*** 0.0343*** 
 [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0055] [0.0055] 
Infringe*OFTThreat -0.0120 -0.0120 -0.0019 -0.0018 
 [0.0092] [0.0091] [0.0104] [0.0103] 
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 1080 1080 530 530 
Notes: 
1. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3b: Robustness Checks – Key Results from a Shortened Data Period 
  log(Real Day Fees) log(Real Boarding Fees) 
Competition variable 
measured in 
1 mile radius 10 mile radius 25 mile radius 50 mile radius 
Infringe 0.1796*** 0.1793*** 0.0664*** 0.0659*** 
 [0.0324] [0.0324] [0.0229] [0.0229] 
Postintervention -0.0129*** -0.0127*** -0.0171*** -0.0171*** 
 [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0056] [0.0056] 
Infringe*Post (DiD) -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0042 -0.0043 
 [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0060] [0.0060] 
OFTThreat 0.0416*** 0.0418*** 0.0441*** 0.0441*** 
 [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0032] [0.0032] 
Infringe*OFTThreat -0.0096* -0.0097* -0.0076 -0.0076 
 [0.0055] [0.0055] [0.0059] [0.0059] 
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1116 1116 655 655 
Notes:  
1. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4: Propensity Matching Results 
  log(Real Day Fees) log(Real Boarding Fees) 
Competition 
variable measured 
in 
 1 mile 
radius 
10 mile 
radius 
25 mile 
radius 
50 mile 
radius 
Nearest neighbour 
matching 
ATT 0.166* 0.241** 0.084 0.042 
 t-
statistic 
1.658 2.311 1.191 0.615 
Radius matching ATT 0.271*** 0.267*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 
 t-
statistic 
4.805 4.641 2.997 3.094 
Kernel matching ATT 0.177* 0.248** 0.059 0.052 
 t-
statistic 
1.828 2.517 1.070 0.902 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
32 
 
 
Figure 1: Average School Fees over the Period 2002/2003-2011/2012 
 
Source: The Good Schools Guide and The Financial Times Guide, various issues. 
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i This partly explains the decision to use a Year variable to capture the general upward trend 
in fee levels in recent years. However, this variable was also used to ensure comparability 
with The Office of Fair Trading (2012) analysis discussed below.  
ii Nevertheless, Harrington Jr. and Chang (2012) highlight conditions under which leniency 
for whistle-blower schemes can increase as well as reduce the incidence of cartels. 
iii McMillen et al. (2007) should be highlighted as an analysis of spatial competition in an 
education market, although that paper focuses on price competition in cross-sectional data for 
US private universities.  
iv Fees for the academic year 2003/2004 are assumed to have been set prior to the cartel being 
exposed in 2003. 
v In recent years some, predominantly, independent schools have submitted their pupils for 
the International Baccalaureate examination rather than A-level examinations which are more 
standardly used across the UK. 
vi Note that the term boarding fees encompasses both the tuition and boarding components of 
fees. 
vii Note that the 2003/2004 fees are likely to have been set before the start of The OFT 
investigation in 2003. Nevertheless, one of the robustness checks discussed in Section 4.2 
below considers an alternative dummy variable that takes the value unity in the 2003/2004; 
2004/2005 and 2005/2006 academic years. 
viii One and ten mile radii were selected for day schools to approximate distances that may be 
easily commutable on foot and by car. 
ix Dummy variables were not created for schools affiliated to non-Christian religions as there 
were so few of these schools in the dataset. 
x The OLS results are typically very robust in terms of coefficient signs and significance 
levels even if the magnitudes of individual coefficients sometimes differ. 
xi Dummy variables for schools under GEMS and Cognita ownership are not included as 
there was only one GEMS and one Cognita school in the final dataset. There are 7 Woodard; 
6 UCST; 12 Eton; 18 Rugby; 5 YBSG; 22 GDST schools in the final dataset. School 
dummies are excluded because of the multicollinearity issue with school grouping dummies.  
xii See Appendix 1 for details of the schools in the Eton and Rugby groups who were also part 
of the Sevenoaks cartel. 
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xiii Nevertheless, there appear to be no similarities in fee setting strategies that can be linked 
to schools that share any Christian religious affiliation.   
xiv Full results are of course available on request and withheld only for the sake of brevity. 
xv Results withheld for the sake of brevity but of course available on request. 
